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Background
The quest for value dominates contemporary health policy. Value, properly defined, is not about cost
savings but about the balance of costs and health benefits — improving the average cost
effectiveness of health interventions. In choosing which care is funded, insurers are a crucial but
commonly neglected driver of health system value.
Insurers can increase health system value by covering fewer costineffective interventions or
covering more costeffective interventions. Perhaps the earliest attempt to reform insurance,
managed care, attempted to pursue both goals, but by the time it was implemented it widely focused
(or was perceived to focus) on costcontainment.
A recent insurance reform proposal, known as Relative Value Health Insurance (RVHI), received
considerable attention, for instance, in The Upshot, The Incidental Economist, and Forbes. RVHI
enables insurers to reduce their contractual obligation to cover “usual and customary” care. This and
similar earlier proposals rely on the insurers’ natural incentive to cut costs. Less wellcovered,
however, are proposals to alter the very incentives of insurers to improve health, which we will call
“payforperformanceforinsurers” (P4P4I).
Like RVHI and its relatives, P4P4I proposals allow insurers to deny coverage for expensive care that
provides few health benefits, but they also incentivize insurers to cover care that they suspect will
improve health cheaply. P4P4I faces substantial drawbacks, however, which limit its ability to
substitute for traditional health insurance or its RVHIreformed variants.
In this post, we will categorize existing insurancebased proposals according to whether they reduce
contractual obligations to cover care (contract reform proposals) or increase insurer incentives to
improve health (P4P4I). We will examine the limitations and advantages of each. Finally, we will offer
a proposal for combining the two into a more efficient insurance product.

Overview Of Insurance Reform Proposals
Before discussing the relative merits of each proposal, we first describe each. This is not meant to be
a definitive list, but rather to capture many of the major proposals in common discussion today or
which have interesting features related to the health improvement/cost containment tradeoff.
Relative Value Health Insurance proposes that, rather than the government ranking plans based on
the anticipated percentage of all costs that they cover–as is the case with the current “metal” rating
system in the exchanges–the government should rank plans based on the maximum cost
effectiveness of interventions that they cover. As an attempt to allow insurers to deny coverage for

care that is very expensive relative to the amount of additional health improvement provided, it is
spiritually similar to what could be called the Pauly Plan (“last year’s care at last year’s prices”) or
even the pure form of managed care (consider the number of denials issued by early 1990’s HMO’s).
All three approaches — MC, RVHI, and Pauly — operationalize these denials somewhat differently,
however. Managed care seeks to customize denials on a perpatient basis, but in untethering itself
from explicit contractual language about each intervention opens itself to substantial legal disputes.
RVHI declares a costeffectiveness threshold above which no care will be covered. Pauly’s proposal
primarily serves to limit coverage of new interventions. (Pauly also alluded to the possibility of using
costeffectiveness for existing interventions, but for the purposes of this post that component of his
proposal will be lumped in with RVHI.)
By contrast, payforperformance schemes aimed at insurers do not attempt to specify in advance
what interventions the insurer must cover or must not be obligated to cover. Instead, they look at
outcomes, from proximal ones such as what proportion of patients receive screening thought to be
related to health, to distal (or longerterm, more indirect) ones such as blood pressure, to true health
outcomes such as the number of myocardial infarctions and deaths.
P4P4I has received much less attention than payforperformanceforproviders (typically just called
“payforperformance”) or payforperformanceforpatients (P4P4P). The major example so far has
been the Medicare Advantage Quality Bonus Payments Demonstration program (MA QBP). The QBP
program has focused heavily on process measures; its 48 performance measures include only 3
outcome measures (e.g. readmissions) and 8 intermediate outcome measures (e.g. proportion of
diabetics whose blood sugar was wellcontrolled). PayforHealth, a proposal by one of the authors,
is conceptually similar, but would involve much more substantial payments for broad outcomes such
as the mortality rate.
To understand how P4P4I proposals differ from the contract reform proposals, and in what
circumstances they produce similar results, we must dig deeper into the economics of health
insurance.

A Brief Introduction To Some Of The Economics Of Health Insurance
A simple but powerful model of insurance is to conceive of it as having just two stages in which
decisions must be made, corresponding to the annual purchase/consume cycles of most health
insurance. In the first period (often during an open enrollment period), an individual purchases an
insurance contract. In the second (the covered period), she either gets sick or she doesn’t. Then the
cycle begins again with the purchase of the next year’s contract. The question we are concerned with
when comparing insurance reform proposals is what interventions the insurer covers in the second
period.
Game theorists would call this a “twoperiod, repeated game.” In a repeated game in which a
customer purchases a bottle of water at his corner store, he is largely protected from fraud (say, the
cashier claiming he handed her a $5 bill instead of a $20 when providing change) because the store
knows his future business is worth more than the value of this one transaction. In a repeated game in
which he buys a used car, however, he might be stuck with paying too high a price or receiving a low
quality automobile. Two factors combine to produce this different result: the amount of this transaction
relative to the anticipated number of future transactions is high, and the amount of information he has
is low–if the car breaks three years later he might not necessarily blame to the car salesman.
Health insurance suffers from both of these problems. Turnover in the health insurance market is
high, meaning each year’s contract represents a substantial fraction of the revenue the issuer will
receive from each customer. And, because there are thousands of potential diseases one could
develop, each of which with its own evidence base on which interventions improve health and in
whom, customers are not likely to notice if the insurer doesn’t cover less visible but healthimproving
interventions.

This problem is particularly acute because, as pointed out by Korobkin and others, with health
insurance, the insurer may not want the customers who have the most information about the quality of
their product (those who have used substantial amounts of care this year) to buy contracts again the
next year, because they are more likely to have higher expenses next year. So insurance companies’
incentives are to cover care to the extent that they are legally and contractually obligated, avoid any
allowable coverage denials that might receive enough publicity to hurt future contract purchases, and
otherwise deny care.
The traditional solution to this problem was the “usual and customary” wording of most insurance
contracts. Unfortunately, because of the phenomenon of moral hazard, consumers push for the
insurer to pay for care in period 2 that they would not be interested in paying in period 1. Thus, in a
traditional health insurance arrangement, we should expect that insurers cover every healthimproving
intervention they are contractually required to cover–no matter how poor its costeffectiveness.
Since contract wording is the problem when it comes to too much care, contract wording may provide
the solution. The contract reform proposals operationalize this in slightly different ways. The pure
version of managed care added other contractual language giving HMOs power to deny or burden
certain claims. The Pauly Plan leaves past coverage largely intact but deals with spending growth by
empowering insurers to limit coverage of new technologies representing incremental improvements.
Korobkin’s Relative Value Health Insurance goes after existing interventions that are costineffective
by essentially changing contract wording to, “Usual and customary care not exceeding a cost
effectiveness of X.”
If traditional health insurance covered every possible healthimproving intervention, then these
proposals would offer a Panglossian solution: the most health possible for a given insurance dollar.
However, given the myriad complaints of providers, public health officials, and providers about denial
of costeffective care by even feeforservice insurers (as well as suggestive anecdotes such as the
decadeslong noncoverage of expensive but highly costeffective smoking cessation programs and
other examples), that may not be the case. Insurers may be particularly loathe to cover unusual or
not customary care, such as behavioral economics interventions or quality improvement initiatives.
Payforperformanceforinsurer proposals tackle the problem of underprovision of highvalue
interventions. Rather than contractually requiring coverage of usual and customary care, then
allowing noncoverage of certain types of care which may be lowvalue, they place the insurer at risk
if customer health does not improve, using metrics related to the patient’s health outcomes.
For a P4P4I contract, in the first period a consumer (the insured individual, employer, or government
agency) purchases a contract that stipulates penalties and rewards to the insurer that vary depending
on the health state of each patient or population of patients. In the second period the insured winds up
in a given health state and the insurer pays out accordingly. If the incentives are big enough, the
insurer should cover care that makes measured disease states less likely, be it through primary
prevention or treatment.
The MA QBP program, then, is really two insurance contracts. The first is a traditional health
insurance contract, stipulating that the insurer will pay for all usual and customary care. The second
is the contract on health metrics, stipulating that the insurer will receive more or fewer dollars when
given health outcomes are achieved. There is no reason to think that the first contract could not be
reformed according to either the RVHI or Pauly proposals, as will be discussed later.

Advantages And Disadvantages Of Each Proposal
There is no clearly superior proposal. Rather, each carries with it various tradeoffs and
assumptions. The table summarizes these differences (click on table for enlarged view).

Author’s note: Korobkin’s proposal is ambiguous as to whether unconventional interventions that fall
within the costeffectiveness threshold of a plan would be covered. It seems not implausible that such
an arrangement could be written into contracts.
Value
New interventions are often very expensive relative to health benefits (both because fixed
development costs have been paid long ago and because the “easy” targets in drug development
were the first to be targeted). Therefore, an insurer operating under RVHI and one operating under the
Pauly Plan will have substantial overlap in which interventions they will deny coverage for. With
either, the cost effectiveness can be finetuned for each plan by changing the threshold.
In their purest form, P4P4I contracts take the value proposition one step further: not only do they
enable denial of payment for interventions that are expensive relative to the amount of health benefit,
but they enable the insurer to decide on a perpatient basis what to cover and what not to, as long as
health improves sufficiently. It also allows insurers to substitute freely between “usual and
customary” care and unusual and not customary interventions such as health systems interventions,
quality improvement interventions, behavioral economics interventions, and public healthstyle
interventions. While many of these are being covered tentatively by a few insurers, because insurers
are not contractually obligated to cover them, their future remains uncertain if they are merely very
costeffective rather than costsaving.
Domains of health covered
In its pure form (not attached to a traditional health insurance contract), P4P4I can address only those
health concerns for which there is a metric available. Particularly likely to be neglected are mental
health and other health domains which are not only difficult to measure, but for which available
measurements are subjective and therefore subject to manipulation when substantial sums are at
risk. The Pauly Plan’s emphasis on past treatments may bias coverage away from particular domains
for which newer treatments predominate (neurological or oncological treatments, for instance), but
overall it is much more able to cover the broad sweep of human health than P4P4I proposals. This
may be why MA QBP is tied to traditional health insurance rather than a pure, standalone P4P4I
contract.
RVHI is an intermediate case. While there is no technical barrier to developing comparative
effectiveness measures for all domains of health, the studies are expensive and even at postACA
levels of funding it would take decades to develop enough of a knowledge base on which to base an
insurance plan. Instead, Korobkin proposes to couple RVHI to what is essentially the Pauly Plan —
grandfather in interventions covered before some date, and require all new interventions to come with
costeffectiveness numbers. Just as in the interest of feasibility the MA QBP demonstration linked a
P4P4I contract to a traditional health insurance plan, to practically cover more than a few narrow
domains of health, RVHI may need to be linked to a (modified) traditional health insurance plan.

Data requirements, governmental intervention, and ease of enforcement
The Pauly Plan’s strength is its ease of enforcement and low data requirements — all parties,
including courts, should be able to agree on the introduction date of a new intervention. RVHI and
P4P4I schemes require considerably more data and consequent governmental involvement in
contract enforcement. Compared to managed care, they are more easily enforceable (for those
interventions for which cost/comparativeeffectiveness studies have been conducted or those health
outcomes for which metrics are available), but compared to the Pauly Plan they are considerably less
so.
Adverse selection and “cherrypicking”
Any proposal that seeks to limit the generosity of care will be subject to adverse selection (sicker
customers selecting into more generous plans) when traditional insurance plans are available.
Korobkin and Frakt offer several solutions for this, including shorter open enrollment periods and
exclusion of lowvalue care for some period after switching to a more generous plan. Selection
problems with P4P4I, by contrast, come from the insurer’s selection decisions. Because performance
pay is rewarded relative to the expected health outcomes, insurers will profit handsomely if they are
able to attract a healthier customer base. Competition among insurers may be utilized to partially
mitigate this problem, by making payments relative to how other insurers’ patients fared rather than
relative to an absolute standard.
Whence the ACO
Accountable Care Organizations encourage care coordination and are at least potentially incentivized
based on health metrics, albeit with substantial drawbacks. Given the breadth of different structures
allowable under the ACO umbrella, however, they may be the best hope for implementing P4P4I, at
least among those ACOs which incorporate an insurance component or are otherwise large enough to
build true health outcomes in as metrics. Even in the absence of an insurerACO, however, they may
be efficient partners for insurers which have adopted contract reform or P4P4I to implement their
valueimproving interventions.

Combining Complementary Characteristics
No plan, be it contract reform or P4P4Ibased, has a clear advantage over the others. Combining
several proposals may have substantial benefits. For instance, an insurer might offer a plan which
covered care with demonstrated costeffectiveness below $25,000 per QualityAdjusted Life Year
(RVHI), also covered all “usual and customary” care invented more than a decade prior (Pauly Plan),
and in which the insurer refunded 50 precent of premia if allcause mortality among the insured rose
more than two standard deviations above its peers and conversely received an additional 50 percent
of premia if allcause mortality fell by an equivalent amount (P4P4I).
The strengths of each component complement the others weaknesses. Including broad coverage of
medical care mitigates concerns over adverse selection and omitted domains of health inherent to
highpowered P4P4I schemes. Including usual and customary care deemed acceptable in the past
helps to jumpstart the feasibility of RVHI given the limited amount of comparative effectiveness
research currently available. Including coverage of newer, highly costeffective interventions (both
through RVHI and through P4P4I) makes pushing back the datebased cutoff of the Pauly Plan more
palatable.
Palatability–both political and individual–may be the strongest argument for bringing these insurance
reform elements together. Since, in Pauly’s words, we lack the courage to adopt “cost reducing but
slightly quality reducing innovations,” coupling a healthimproving, costincreasing redesign of
insurance with a healthneutral or slightly healthreducing but substantially costreducing redesign
may finally make ‘rationing’ politically viable. At least as importantly, it may finally achieve the long
elusive goal of shifting insurance dollars from expensive, lowbenefit care to less expensive, higher
benefit care.

 :   ,   ,  , 
:    ,  , , , 
 , , , , ,  , , 

About Health Affairs Blog | Contact Health Affairs Blog | Terms Of Use | Project HOPE
Copyright 1995  2017 by Project HOPE: The PeopletoPeople Health Foundation, Inc., eISSN 15445208.
Health Affairs gratefully acknowledges the support of many funders.

